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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GLENDA BETH SMUIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF 
Case No: 
Priority 
1 
APPELLANT 
95-0477 CA 
No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD REVIEW 
Did the District Court error in denying the Appellant's Motion 
to Suppress on the basis that inadequate and untruthful evidence 
was presented to the magistrate for the issuance of a search 
warrant. The standard review in this case as to questions of 
fact is one of "Clear error". As the questions of law, the 
standard is whether the magistrate had a substantive basis to 
conclude that in the totality of the circumstances, the 
affidavit adequately established probable cause for the issuance 
of a search warrant. State vs. Hansen, 732 P 2d 127 (Utah 
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1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case is governed in part by Title 77, Chapter, 23, 
Sections 202 and 203 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Courtfs conviction 
of the Defendant of the crime of production of marijuana, a 
third degree felony entered by the Court on the 11th day of 
July, 1995. More specifically this is an appeal of the Court's 
denial of a Motion to Suppress evidence based on a defective 
search warrant which was ruled upon by the Court on the 29th day 
of March, 1995. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On or about the 20th day of January, 1995, Deputy Vance Norton 
of the Uintah County Sheriff's Office obtained a search warrant 
from the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable John R. 
Anderson, presiding, for the search of a residence owned and 
occupied by the Defendant, Glenda Beth Smuin, just south of 
Vernal, Uintah County, State of Utah. The facts upon which the 
search warrant was issued were contained in an Affidavit for 
search warrant sworn to by Deputy Vance Norton. The Affidavit 
was based primarily on the statements of a 7 year old neighbor 
of the defendant and referred to the young girl's seeing a 
human skull in the residence of the Defendant. The skull was 
2 
supposed to have been seen by the young girl several weeks prior 
to her making the statement to Deputy Norton. The alleged human 
skull was shown to the young girl by one Dallas Rowley, a non-
occupant of the residence. The fact of non-residency was known 
to the police officer but omitted from the Affidavit for a 
search warrant which was presented to the magistrate. Based on 
the search warrant, Uintah County Sheriff's Department's 
Deputies searched the defendant's residence and in the course of 
the search found several small growing marijuana plants. 
Following the preliminary hearing, a Motion to Suppress the 
Evidence was filed with the Court. After an evidentiary hearing 
and argument, the trial court denied the Motion to Suppress on 
the 29th day of March, 1995. A conditional plea of guilty was 
tendered to the court on the 16th day of May, 1995 reserving the 
issue of the suppression of the evidence for appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The issue presented to the court is whether 
or not the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the 
evidence obtained pursuant to a defective search warrant which 
was based on stale, false, and inadequate information and 
without probable cause. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Suppress is in 
error. The trial court's improperly examined the facts 
presented to the magistrate. When the information which was 
intentionally omitted from the Affidavit is added to the 
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Affidavit, there is an inadequate showing of probable cause that 
a criminal offense took place. The information that was 
presented was so stale as to render a determination of probable 
cause to be incorrect. The police officers were improperly in 
the defendants residence and therefore the plain view doctrine 
does not apply. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ANALYZED THE ISSUE OF MATERIALLY 
OMITTED EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR 
ANALYZING MATERIAL OMISSIONS MADE IN AN AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT. 
On January 20, 1995, Officer Vance Norton presented an 
Affidavit for Search Warrant to the Eighth Judicial District 
Court. The Affidavit was entitled State of Utah vs. Dallas 
Rowley. Paragraph four of the Affidavit stated that the 
property sought to be searched was premises located at 3975 
South Vernal Avenue, Vernal, Uintah County, Utah. Paragraph 
five of the Affidavit lays out the facts upon which the 
magistrate was to make his decision. Paragraph five 5b gives 
the only evidence relating to any specific location of alleged 
contraband in the Affidavit. In that paragraph, the Affiant 
described an interview with one Crystal Jacobs in which she 
indicated that she had been shown a human skull at the Beth 
Smuin house by Dallas Rowley. She also stated that "The skulls 
were (sic) were dug up by Dallas Rowley when he was hunting and 
4 
trapping". It was also stated that her view of the skull had 
occurred in the past "several weeks". At the hearing on the 
Motion to Suppress, Officer Vance Norton, the officer who 
procured the search warrant, testified that he had no 
information whatsoever that Dallas Rowley resided at 3975 South 
Vernal Avenue, (REC p.11). He testified that he actually knew 
that Dallas Rowley resided at a different location, (REC p. 11). 
He also indicated that he had no information to indicate that 
any skull was still at 3975 South Vernal Avenue, (REC p. 12). 
Those facts were specifically omitted from the search warrant. 
There is no question that the omission was made knowingly by 
Officer Norton. This relevant information was and would be 
critical in making a proper determination of probable cause. 
When material information is falsely presented to a magistrate 
in an application for a search warrant, the procedure for a 
reviewing court is clear. In State vs. Nielson, 727 P. 2d 188 
(Utah, 1986), our Supreme Court followed the legal principles 
espoused in Franks vs. Delaware, 57 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1978). The 
procedure outlined is that any false statements intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly made should be deleted from a search 
warrant Affidavit. The reviewing in court should then 
independently re-examine the Affidavit for a search warrant. A 
new determination of probable cause based on the amended 
affidavit is to be made. If the amended affidavit provides 
probable cause, the warrant shall stand. If there is no 
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probable cause based on the amended affidavit, the warrant 
fails. The Utah Court in Nielsen added that "The same test 
applies when a misstatement occurs because information is 
omitted; The affidavit must be evaluated to determine if it will 
support a finding of probable cause when the omitted information 
is inserted. If an Affidavit fails to support a finding of 
probable cause after the false statement are excised or the 
omitted information is added, i.e., if the omission or 
misstatement materially effects the finding of probable cause, 
any evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must 
be suppressed". As the Nielson Court also stated, "To allow a 
police officer to obtain a warrant utilizing false information 
tends to undermine respect for the legal system and to make the 
public cynical about the honesty and professionalism of those 
entrusted in law enforcement". 
The District Court made no specific finding whether or not the 
omissions were material. The Judge did not follow the procedure 
outlined by the Nielson Court and the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
District Court, without making any written findings of facts 
merely ruled that a statement contained in paragraph 5b of the 
Affidavit that the skull was "repackaged and put away" was 
sufficient to indicate a tie to the described residence at 3975 
South Vernal Avenue. The Court erred in the procedure it used 
in evaluating that warrant. 
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POINT TWO: 
WITH THE OMITTED FACTS INCLUDED IN THE AFFIDAVIT, THE 
AFFIDAVIT IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS TOO 
STALE TO BE PROPERLY INDICATIVE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
When the Affidavit for a Search Warrant is examined with a 
complete recitation of the facts, that recitation basically is 
that an eight year old girl, in the several weeks before the 
warrant was issued, had a human skull exhibited to her by an 
individual who did not reside at the residence, which was then 
repackaged and put away. The information that the skull had not 
been seen recently must leave the court to an examination of 
what the phrase "several weeks" means in the context of an 
Affidavit for Search Warrant. Search Warrant Affidavits are to 
be construed in a common sense, reasonable manner. State vs. 
Williamson, 674 P. 2d 133 (Utah 1983). That common sense 
reading is to be based on the totality of the circumstances 
presented to the court. Illinois vs. Gates, 76 L Ed 2d 527, 
(1983). It is fundamental, however, that the facts presented in 
an Affidavit for a Search Warrant must be sufficiently fresh to 
show there is a reasonable probability that the evidence sought 
for in the Search Warrant is still at the location described. 
Probable cause must be found to exist at the time the Warrant 
issues and the proof must be of facts so closely related to time 
of the issue of the Warrant as to justify a finding of probable 
cause at that time. See Sgro vs. United States, 11 L Ed 260 
(1932). There is no firm rule as to what a reasonable lapse of 
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time may be between the description of alleged contraband and 
the time of issuance of the Warrant. There is very little Utah 
case law on the subject. It is, suggested, however, in State 
vs. Hansen, 732 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1987), that a passage of time is 
something that may invalidate the support factual basis for a 
warrant. In Hansen, a five day lapse of time was held to be 
insufficient to invalidate the basis for the warrant. The Utah 
Court, however, did suggest that some evidence of the continuing 
nature of the alleged contraband's presence should be included 
in the Search Warrant sufficient that a common sense reasonable 
reading would support a conclusion that the contraband was still 
there. A review of the case law does not provide any firm rules 
but where there were no other facts indicating a continuing 
violation, a four day interval between the time of an illegal 
sale of alcohol and the issuance of a Search Warrant was held to 
necessitate suppressing the evidence in People vs. Siemieniec, 
118 NW 2d 430, (Michigan 1962). A lapse of twelve days was 
condemned in Siden vs. United States, F 2d 241 (Eighth Circuit, 
1925). Sgro vs. United States supra involved a lapse of twenty-
one days. In United States vs. Nickels, 89 F supp 953 (1950 DC 
Arkansas) twenty-one days was held to be too long a gap in time. 
In this case we are faced with the phraseology "several 
weeks". A common sense reading of that phrase would indicate 
more than two weeks, that is more than fourteen days and 
possibly much more. There was no evidence whatsoever of any 
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continuing presence by Dallas Rowley at 3975 South Vernal 
Avenue. He had not resided at that residence. There is no 
indication that he stored property at that location. In other 
words, no evidence was presented regarding a continuing presence 
of the skull. In the absence of any facts suggesting that 
continuing connection between the skull and the location 
searched, common sense dictates that the information was too 
stale to provide probable cause for the warrant. 
POINT THREE 
THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE IN THAT IT DID 
NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE PROPERTY OR EVIDENCE SOUGHT 
TO BE SEIZED WAS UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED, POSSESSED OR WAS 
EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONTACT. 
The procedure for the issuance of Search Warrants is outlined 
in Title 77, Chapter 23, Sections 202 and 203, Utah Code 
Annotated. Section 202 of that Chapter states "Property or 
evidence may be seized pursuant to a Search Warrant if there is 
probable cause to believe it: 
1. Was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed; 
2. Has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal a commission of an offence; 
3. Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
Section 203 (2) states that "If the item sought to be seized is 
evidence of illegal conduct, and is in the possession of a 
person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe such person or entity is a 
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party to the alleged illegal conduct, no Search Warrant shall 
issue except upon a finding by the magistrate that the evidence 
sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, or that such 
evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if 
sought by subpoena. In this case, the Affidavit for Search 
Warrant, paragraph three, states that the property sought is 
evidence of illegal conduct, or was unlawfully acquired or 
unlawfully possessed, or is used to conceal or commit any crime. 
Officer Norton indicated in court that the alleged crime with 
which he was concerned was outlined in Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Sections 901, 902, and 903, Utah Code Annotated but stated 
nothing about any crime in the affidavit, (REC p. 14). Section 
902 (1) is a definitions section. Section 902 states that "It 
is unlawful to alter, remove, injure, or destroy antiquities 
without the landowner's consent". Subsection 2 states that "It 
is unlawful to reproduce, rework, or forge any antiquities or 
make any object, where the copies were not, or falsely label, 
describe, identify, or offer for sale or exchange any object 
with the intent to represent the item object as original and 
genuine, nor may any person offer any object for sale or 
exchange that was collected or excavated in violation of this 
chapter." When the Affidavit for a Search Warrant is examined 
for its factual basis, there is a total lack of evidence upon 
which the magistrate could conclude that the property was 
unlawfully acquired, unlawfully possessed, or was evidence of 
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illegal conduct. The mere possession of antiquities is not a 
crime under 76-6-902. That crime relates to removal of 
antiquities without permission of a landowner or the forging of 
antiquities. The only thing that was presented to the 
magistrate was that Dallas Rowley was in possession of an Indian 
skull. There is nothing in the Warrant to state that the skull 
which was allegedly shown to Crystal Jacobson and described in 
paragraph 5b of the Affidavit was an American Indian skull. 
Nothing was presentd to the magistrate indicating that when the 
skull may have been obtained, from whence it may hve been 
obtained or what made any possession illegal. 
The State may fall back that on a theory that the skull might 
have been evidence of illegal conduct, but the conditions 
precedent to issuance of a Warrant for evidence of illegal 
conduct were not satisfied. There was no showing that the 
evidence could not be obtained by subpoena. 
POINT 4 
IF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALIDLY ISSUED, THE SEIZING 
OFFICERS WERE ILLEGALLY ON THE PREMISES OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
THEREFORE A PLAIN VIEW SEARCH MAY NOT BE JUSTIFIED. 
The evidence seized in this case consisted of several 
marijuana plants. The rationale for the State's seizure of 
those plants is that they were clear evidence of illegal conduct 
found in plain view while the Officers were lawfully searching 
the Defendant's home pursuant to the search warrant. The plain 
view doctrine has been outlined by this Court in State vs. 
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Holmes, 774 P. 2d 506 (Utah App. 1989). There are three pre-
requirements necessary to validate seizure under the plain view 
doctrine: (1) Lawful presence of the Officer, (2) Evidence is 
in plain view; and (3) Evidence that is clearly incriminating. 
It is clear that the only reason for the Officer1s being in the 
Defendantf s home was to search for the property described in the 
defective search warrant. If the Search Warrant was unlawful, 
the officer's presence was unlawful, therefore the plain view 
doctrine does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case indicates that several material 
omissions were knowingly made by the Officer in his preparation 
for the Affidavit for Search Warrants. The materiality of those 
omissions is particularly relevant in that those omissions 
reveal that under the totality of the circumstances the 
information in the affidavit was stale. Further the Affidavit 
was insufficient in showing that the evidence sought for was 
evidence of a crime. If the Search Warrant therefore was 
improperly issued. If the Search Warrant was improperly issued, 
the Officer's presence in the home was unlawful and the seizure 
of the marijuana plants upon which this case is based was 
therefore unlawful. 
DATED I 6 udav this FgJp^*rt rV 1996. 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I did mail, postage prepaid, four true 
and correct copies of the forgoing Brief to Jan Graham, Attorney 
for Appellee, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114 on this [U^ day of \?h^xtir^^ 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT AND ORDER 
FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
vs. : 
DALLAS ROWLEY, : CASE NO. 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH } 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UINTAH } 
The Affiant undersigned being sworn states on oath: 
1. I am a peace officer in the State of Utah. I have 
been a police officer for more than one year. For all of that time 
I have been employed by the Uintah County Sheriff's Office. I am 
assigned to the patrol division. My duties there have included the 
investigation of property crimes. During my career I have been 
involved in the investigation and/or arrests of at least one 
hundred (100) persons for property crimes. 
I attended the Utah Police Academy and am currently 
a certified police officer in the State of Utah. During my career, 
I have attended many hours of in service training which includes 
training into the investigation of property crimes. 
1-1 
2. The property for which a search warrant is sought is 
described as follows: human skulls, human skeletal remains, burial 
artifacts and associated items. 
3. The grounds for issuing a search warrant, as 
provided by Utah Code Annotated 77-23-202, are as follows: the 
property is evidence of illegal conduct, or was unlawfully acquired 
or unlawfully possessed, or is used to conceal or commit any crime. 
4. I have probable cause to believe, and do believe, 
that the property is located on the premises known or described as: 
3975 South Vernal Avenue, Vernal, Uintah County, Utah, a residence 
at the corner of Vernal Avenue and 4000 South Street, consisting of 
two brown and white single-wide mobile homes joined under one roof, 
a shed, and numerous junk automobiles and any motor vehicles 
located at the residence or parked on public streets immediately 
adjacent thereto. 
5. The facts to establish the grounds for the issuance 
of a search warrant are: 
a. On Tuesday, January 17, 1995, I spoke with Don 
Jacobs who was then at the residence of his ex-
wife, Linda Jacobs. Don Jacobs told me that he 
then saw a large bone which he believed to be a 
dinosaur bone in Linda Jacob's residence. I also 
heard Don Jacob's daughter, Crystal Jacobs, tell 
Don Jacobs that she had seen a human skull. Don 
Jacobs then told me that Linda Jacob's boyfriend, 
Dallas Rowley, currently possessed an American 
Indian human skull. 
b. On Friday, January 20, 1995, Detective Wayne 
Hollebeke and your affiant interviewed Crystal 
Jacobs. Crystal Jacobs is eight years old. 
Crystal Jacobs told me that she had been shown a 
human skull at the Beth Smuin house by Dallas 
Rowley. She described the house as being a trailer 
on the corner up from her house and as having many 
junk cars in front. Crystal said that the skull 
was brought in the main room and placed onto the 
top of the television, then it was repackaged and 
put away. She said that this occurred in the past 
several weeks. She told me that she had been told 
that the skulls were dug up by Dallas Rowley when 
he was hunting and trapping. 
c. I drove to 3975 South Vernal Avenue, Vernal, Utah 
and saw a residence consisting of two trailer homes 
joined under a single roof. There were several 
junk cars immediately outside the residence. The 
residence is visible from the Linda Jacob's 
residence, just up the street and on the corner. 
It is in all respects consistent with the 
description given by Crystal Jacobs. 
d. Don Jacobs told me that he saw animal pelts at 
Linda Jacob's residence that he believed were 
illegally taken by Dallas Rowley. I learned from 
A.P. & P. Special Agent Jim Murray that Dallas 
Rowley is a professional hunter and is on 
probation. He was previously charged with numerous 
weapons violations as well as illegally taking big 
game in Colroado. I have not been able to yet 
determine the dispositin of these charges. 
e. On January 20, 1995, I spoke with Mrs. Beverly 
Jacobs who told me that her granddaughter, Kathy 
Jacobs, another daughter of Linda and Don Jacobs, 
told her not long ago that she had seen human 
skulls shown to her by Dallas Rowley. 
DATE SIGNED: \-'>D-^\ TIME SIGNED: g.y^f.Ht, 
. VANCE /JJSRTO* L ' 'I O N
This Affidavit was sworn to be before me by Affidavit on the 
date and at the time shown. 
IT IS ORDERED that a search warrant be issued for the articles 
and places described in the above affidavit, for an immediate 
search in the daytime and upon notice. 
DATE SIGNED: (-yc^< TIME SIGNED^ ?:/C^^< 
"'niSTKTCT^OURT JUDGE 
1 j WHILE I WAS THERE I SAW DEA^LNE MILLECAM, WHO I KNOW DOESN'T 
2 | LIVE THERE, AND SHE BROjX^HT OUT AND SHOWED ME ^ DNE OF HER ART 
3 I THINGS THAT SHE DOES< WHICH IS A HUMAN SCULPTURE, AND THEN SHE 
4 PUT IT AWAY, ISyTHAT PROBABLE CAUSE T£AT SEVERAL WEEKS LATER 
5 THAT IS STILJ/AT LYNN PAYNE'S HOUSX? AND I SUBMIT THERE IS JtfO 
6 REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION WHEN I1TS OBVIOUSLY A VISITOR, PTS 
7 I OBVIOUSLY A SOCIAL TYPE GATHERING, THAT THAT WOULfk^AISE ANY 
IMBRICATION WHATSOEVER imAT IT WOULD BE STORJ>£\ COMMON SENSE 
9 I SAYS NO. IT'S THE K^ND OF THING YOU BRIJtfG OUT AND SHOW, THEN 
10 YOU TAKE IT WHERE IT GOES, 
11 I THE COURT: TWO WAYS I CAN LOOK AT THIS. ONE IS TO 
GIVE THE OFFICER'S STATEMENT THAT HE TOLD THE MAGISTRATE 
13 I INFORMATION NOT CONTAINED IN THE WARRANT AND THAT WAS 
14 REQUESTED BY THE MAGISTRATE IN MAKING THE DETERMINATION. I 
15 THINK THAT THAT'S A STRONGER CASE FOR THE STATE, ACTUALLY, 
16 BECAUSE IN THAT CASE THE MAGISTRATE WOULD HAVE HAD ACTUAL 
17 KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON FAD LIVED THERE AND WOULD HAVE 
18 ISSUED THE SEARCH WARRANT. I T4INK, REALLY, WHAT I AM 
19 SUPPOSED TO DO IN THIS CASE IS TO CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVIT AND 
20 THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE SEARCH WARRAM ' 
21 WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO WHAT THE CONVERSATION MAY HAVE BEEN 
22 BETWEEN THE MAGISTRATE AND THE OFFICER. AND THE REASON I 
23 THINK THAT THAT'S AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD TO USE IN MOST CASES 
24 IS, OTHERWISE, YOU HAVE ALL TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT IS GIVEN 
25 AND IT'S NOT PLACED UPON THE RECORDS WHERE IT CAN BE REVIEWED. 
1-2 
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COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
1 AND I THINK THAT THAT'S THE REASON THAT THE BURDEN IS UPON THE 
2 DEFENDANT ONCE THE WARRANT HAS BEEN OBTAINED, IS TO ENCOURAGE 
3 POLICE OFFICERS TO COME IN, WRITE THINGS DOWN AND SUBMIT 1 HEM 
4 TO MAGISTRATES WHO HAVE DECISIONS MADE WHICH CAN BE REVIEU "). 
5 AND I BELIEVE IN DOING THAT. I HAVE TO GIVE IT SOME 
6 REASONABLE DEFERENCE TO THE INTERPRETATION THAT THE JUDGE -10 
7 ISSUED THE CITATION GAVE AS IS A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION. 
8 IT'S TRUE THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE WARRANT 
9 ITSELF WHICH TALKS ABOUT WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL WHO IS HE 
10 SUBJECT OF THIS INVESTIGATION, MR. DALLAS ROWLEY, LI'^J. 
11 THERE IS AN INDICATION THAT ITEMS HAD BEEN SEEN AT TWO 
12 RESIDENCES. ONE DON JACOBS, OR RATHER NOT DON JACOB , BUT HIS 
13 FORMER WIFE LINDA JACOBS' RESIDENCE, AND A SEPARATE J SIDENCE. 
14 T THINK A FAIR READING OF THE AFFIDAVIT WOULD INDICA; THAT 
15 THAT THERE ARE TWO, INCLUDING HER STATEMENT, THE Chi" T T 
16 STATEMENT, LINDA JACOBS' DAUGHTER'S STATEMENT ABOUT WHERE THE 
17 SMUIN RESIDENCE WAS IN RELATION ^0 HER RESIDENCE. 1 "HINK 
18 IT'S CLEAR THERE ARE TWO. 
19 THE REAL ISSUE IN 1HIS CASE, TWO ISSUES, ARE 
20 WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICE OFb1CERS DID ANYTHING IN b\D FAITH 
21 IN PROCURRING THE WARRANT. I SEE NOTHING ON THE REC< D THAT 
22 INDICATES THAT THEY DID. NO INDICATION THAT THEY Co . 'IOUSLY 
23 MISLEAD THE MAGISTRATE OR THAT THEY ATTEMPTED TO PLT 
24 INFORMATION IN WHICH THEY KNEW NOT TO BE TfcUE. WH,„ ' WE HAVE 
25 IS INFORMATION THAT WAS MERELY NOT PLACED IN THE AFF UVIT. 
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COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
AND I DON'T THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY BAD FAITH AT ALL IN THE 
OFFICER'S PRESENTATION OF THIS MATTER TO THE MAGISTRATE. AND 
I COME DOWN TO THE LANGUAGE THAT I REFER TO A COUPLE TIMES. 
LAST PART OF THAT — WELL, I'LL READ THE ENTIRE STATEMENT. 
"CRYSTAL SAID THE J'CULL WAS BROUGHT IN THE ROOM AND PLACED ON 
THE TOP OF THE TELEVISION. THEN IT WAS REPACKAGED AND PUT 
AWAY." 
NOW, I AGREE WITH MR. WILLIAMS THAT IT MAY BE THAT 
THAT LANGUAGE IS SUBJECT TO OTHER INTERPRETATION. . BUT I 
THINK THAT THE INTERPRETATION THAT JUDGE ANDERSON MAY HAVE 
GIVEN THAT, APPARENTLY DID GIVE THAT, TS ALSO A REASONABLE 
INTERPRETATION, THAT IT WAS PUT AWAY SOMEWHERE ON Tx PREMISES 
THAT WERE SEARCHED. 
THIS ISN'T THE TYPE OF ITEM THAT IS LIKELY TO BE 
KEPT ON SOMEBODY'S PERSON. A HUMAN SKULL. IT'S NOT COMMON 
FOR PEOPLE TO CARRY AROUND ALL THE TIME HUMAN SKULLS. 
THEREFORE, IT'S THE TYPE OF ITEM THAT NEEDS TO BE KEPT 
SOMEPLACE. AND THE LANGUAGE IN THE AFFIDAVIT, AND I TH t'NK 
IT'S REASONABLE FOR JUDGE ANDERSON TO HAVE BELIEVED THAT IT 
WAS KEPT AT THE RESIDENCE WHICH WAS SEARCHED, 397 5 SOUTH 
VERNAL AVENUE. AND AS I INDICATED, IF I WERE TO REVIEW THE 
MATTER AND GIVE WEIGHT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE POLICE OFFICER 
WHICH WAS THAT HE TOLD JUDGE ANDERSON THAT MR. ROWLEY DIDN'T 
LIVE THERE, I THTNK THAT I WOULD HAVE TO GIVE EVEN GREATER 
WEIGHT TO THAT STATEMENT BECAUSE AFTER RECEIVING THAT 
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1 INFORMATION ISSUED THE WARRANT. BASED UPON THE RECORD, THE 
2 COURT WILL DENY YOUR MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
3 NOW, I FEEL I HAVE RULED FROM THE BENCH. AND MAYBE 
4 I HAVEN'T GIVEN A GOOD ENOUGH RECORD FOR YOU. IS THERE 
5 ANYTHING THAT I SHOULD CONSIDER AS FAR AS MAKING A RECORD .HAT 
6 I HAVE NOT THAT YOL WOULD LIKE TO POINT THE COURT TO? MR. 
7 WALLENTINE? 
8 MR. WALLENTINE: NO, SIR. 
9 THE COURT: MR. BEASLIN? 
10 MR. BEASLIN: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
11 THE COURT: MR. WILLIAMS? 
12 MR. WILLIAMS: WELL, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE — WE >iE£D 
13 A SET OF FINDINGS, WRITTEN FINDINGS IN THIS MATTER, I BELIEVE. 
14 THE COUFT: DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT I NEED TO I<i\KE 
15 FINDINGS OF FACT? 
16 MR. WILLIAMS: I BELIEVE WE NEED SOME WRITTEN 
17 FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS ONE BECAUSE IT IS OF THE NATURE, IT 
18 IS OF A NATURE THAT WERE THIS EVER TO GET TO THE APPEALS COURT 
19 I FEEL LIKE THE FIRST THING THEY WOULD DO IS TURN IT AROUND OZ 
20 SEND IT BACK FOR WRITTEN FINDINGS. 
21 THE COURT: THE ONLY THING I THINK FINDINGS WOULD 
22 BE NECESSARY WOULD BE AS TO GOOD FAITH, AND YOU AS MUCH AS 
23 CONCEDED WHEN I ASKED YOU THAT QUESTION THAT THERE WAS NO 
24 INDICATION AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH YOU PLACED BEFORE 
25 THE COURT WHICH WOULD INDICATE THE OFFICER ACTED IN BAD FATTH 
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